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Abstract
Our concern in this work is to obtain conditions for the uniqueness of equilibria, with
commodity bundles as consumption patterns which depend on the state of the world.
In the ﬁrst section we consider an economy with complete markets, where consumption
spaces are a ﬁnite product of measurable function spaces, with separable and proper utility
functions and with strictly positive endowments. Using the excess utility function the inﬁnite
dimensional problem stated above is reduced to a ﬁnite dimensional one. We obtain local
uniqueness. The degree theory and specially the Poincar´ e-Hopf theorem applied to this excess
utility function, allow us to characterize the cardinality of the equilibrium set, and we ﬁnd
conditions for the global uniqueness of this set.
On the other hand, we obtain conditions for the uniqueness in economies with incomplete
markets and only one good available in each state of the world. When markets are incomplete,
equilibrium allocations are typically not Pareto eﬃcient; then the results obtained in section 1,
can not be generalized here. Nevertheless we show that for the single consumption good case
the ﬁrst theorem of welfare is satisﬁed, and then conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium
can be obtained as straightforward extension of our results shown in the ﬁrst section. This is
a particular simple case on incomplete markets but, is a very important one on ﬁnance theory.
1 Introduction
The ﬁrst four sections of the paper concern exchange economies in which each agent’s utility
depends both upon his consumption vector and the realization of the world. Both trades and
prices can be state contingent. A Walrasian equilibrium thus consists of a pair of measurable
mappings (p,x) deﬁned on the probability space Ω whose elements are the states of the world,
where p(·) speciﬁes the prices and x(·) speciﬁes the net trades as function of the state. The main
problem addressed in the ﬁrst part of the paper concerns the nature of the set of equilibria of
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1such an economy. This is complicated by the fact that the set of states can be inﬁnite, which is
the sense in which the paper considers an inﬁnite number of goods. In the more elementary case
in which there is not uncertainty (i.e., the state of the world is ﬁxed), a Walrasian equilibrium is
given by the solutions of (p) = 0, where (·) is the excess demand function and p is the vector
of prices. Here, however, p(·) is a measurable mapping on a probability space, and so to obtain
a solution for the equation (p) = 0 is nontrivial. Moreover, the existence of the excess demand
function is not a necessary consequence of a maximization process, its existence is rare in inﬁnite
dimensional cases.
In this paper we introduce the excess utility function to characterize the equilibrium set,
showing that it is a powerful tool in order to characterize the equilibrium set. In this sense,
the excess utility function appears as good substitute in inﬁnite dimensional economies, for the
generally inexistent, excess demand function.
On the other hand the excess utility function allows us to obtain a structural relation between
the vector of welfare weights, the equilibrium prices and endowments. It follows, as we will show,
from the fact that there exists an one-to-one correspondence between the zeros of the excess utility
function and the set of Walrasian equilibria.
The excess utility function is deﬁnite on the n−1 dimensional simplex, and interpreting each
element of this simplex as a vector of welfare weights, the weighted sum of the expected utilities
of the agents, is maximized subject to the resource constraint at some particular state contingent
allocation x(s). The solution to this constrained optimization problem determines implicit prices
p(s) (i.e., the Lagrange multipliers at the solution x(s)). The excess utility function e(·) calculates,
for each vector of welfare weights λ, the budget deﬁcit of each of the n traders at the solution x(s)
to the constrained optimization problem. This budget deﬁcit is calculated using the implicit prices
p(s) determined by the solution x(s) and λ. The Pareto optimality of a Walrasian equilibrium is
then invoked to establish that the set of Walrasian equilibrium is in one-to-one correspondence
with the solutions of the equation e(λ) = 0.
Note that, the aggregate utility function depends on the weighting, λ, and it will be aﬀected
when we change their relative magnitudes. Each coordinate of a vector of welfare weights that is
a zero of the excess utility function, will be determined by the distribution of initial endowments
of individuals. Then the prices in the economy will be aﬀected by the distribution of initial
endowments across individuals. In this way we obtain the above mentioned structural relation.
On this subject, G. Becker says “In decentralized economies like our own, families, governments,
and other organizations inﬂuence what to produce... There is a kind of proportional representation
in which the inﬂuence of each person is not ﬁxed nor shared equally. but is strictly proportional to
2his command over resources. Inﬂuence is exerted by oﬀering to exchange these resources for the
goods and services that are desired” [Becker (71)]
On the other hand, this approach allows us to reduce an inﬁnite dimensional problem to a
ﬁnite dimensional one. It is shown in lemma 2, that the excess utility function e(·) has some of
the useful properties that the excess demand function (·) exhibits when there is a single state.
The excess utility function was introduced in [Mas-Colell (85)], (Ch.5, P.174), it is proved that
the excess utility function in the ﬁnite dimensional case, has the same properties of the excess
demand function. In [Mas-Colell (91)], Proposition 1, it is proved that the set of zeros for the
excess utility function is generically ﬁnite. In this paper, for the inﬁnite dimensional case, from
the excess utility function we prove that generically, in the conditions of the model (see section
1) the set of Walrasian equilibria is not empty and that the excess demand function is a vector
function in the conditions of the Poincar´ e-Hopf theorem, then we obtain conditions for uniqueness
of equilibrium.
Note that while the not existence of the demand function is not a serious obstacle for the
study of the existence of equilibrium, it is a serious one for the knowledge of the cardinality
(and uniqueness) of the equilibrium set. Our result generalizes one of Dana, [Dana (93)]. In
this work, R. A. Dana obtains a ﬁrst result on uniqueness for economies with one good in each
state of the world, with inﬁnitely many states. Our result concerns a ﬁnite number of goods in
each state of the world, and allows to use some of well know topological arguments to argue that
the set of Walrasian equilibria in inﬁnite dimensional case, with separable utilities, has the local
uniqueness property, moreover it is generically ﬁnite, and we obtain some suﬃcient conditions for
its uniqueness.
Finally we extend this analysis for the incomplete markets in the special case of one commodity
and J assets. In this case the Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto optimal. This is a particular simple
case on incomplete markets but, it is a very important one on ﬁnance theory. In the general case
of incomplete markets, a Walrasian equilibrium need not be a Pareto optimal.
2 The Model
We shall consider a pure exchange economy with uncertainty in the states of the world Ω. We
shall treat uncertainty us a probability space (Ω,A,ν), where A is the σ−algebra of subsets of Ω
that are events, and ν a probability measure. In each state of the world, there are l commodities
available for consumption and n agents.
We assume that each agent has the same consumption space, M = Πl
j=1Mj where Mj is
3the space of all positive measurable functions deﬁned on (Ω,A,ν).
Let Λ denote the set of functions h : Rl
+ → R satisfying:
• h is C2 on Rl
+, i.e. h has second derivatives on Rl
++ = {x ∈ Rl with all component positive}
and one-sided second derivatives on Rl
+/Rl
++, and these are continuous,
• h(x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rl
+/Rl
++,
• h is diﬀerentially monotonic on Rl
+, i.e. ∂h(x) ≥ 0 (i.e
∂h(x)
∂xj ≥ 0 j = 1,2,...l.) for all x ∈ Rl
+;
• h is diﬀerentially strictly concave on Rl
++, i.e. for all x ∈ Rl
++, the Hessian matrix of second
partial derivatives of h is negative deﬁnite and
• h satisﬁes the ’ ’ inﬁnite marginal utility condition at zero, i.e. the limit of |∂h(x)| is inﬁnite,
when x approaches to the boundary of Rl
++, i.e: the set B = {x : xi = 0 for some i =
1,...,n}.
Let U be the set of all measurable functions U : Ω×Rl
++ → R, such that U(s,·) ∈ Λ for each
s ∈ Ω.
For x,y ∈ Rl we will x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi i = 1..., and we will write x > y if xi ≥ yi i =
1...l and x 6= y.
Deﬁnition 1 A function u is strictly monotone if x > y ⇒ u(x) > u(y).






|U(s,z)| + |∂U(s,z)| + |∂2U(s,z)|
o
.
for any compact K ⊂ Rl
++.
Each agent is characterized by his utility function ui and by his endowment wi ∈ M, i =
{1,2,...,n}, satisfying the following additional conditions:





Ui(s,x(s))dν(s) i = 1,...,n (1)
where for each i = 1,2,...,n, Ui : Ω × Rl
++ → R belongs to a ﬁxed compact set of Λ and
b) for each s ∈ Ω the functions Ui(s, ˙ ) belong to U.
4c) The agent endowments, wi ∈ M are bounded away from zero in any component, i.e. there
exists, h and H two positive numbers such that, h < wij(s) < H for each j = 1...l, and s ∈
Ω.
An economy E is a list (ui,wi),i ∈ I, where I is a set of agents or traders (in our case
I = {1,2,...,n}).
The following deﬁnitions are standard.





k=1 wk(s), for a.e.s ∈ Ω.
Deﬁnition 3 A commodity price system is a measurable function p : Ω → Rl
++. For any
z : Ω → Rl we denote by hp,zi the real number
R
Ω p(s)z(s)dν(s). (Note that p(s)z(s) is the
Euclidean inner product in Rl.)
The following deﬁnition is given in [Mas-Colell (91)]:
Deﬁnition 4 The pair (p,x) is an equilibrium if:
i) p is a commodity price system and x is an allocation,
ii) hp,xii ≤ hp,wii < ∞ ∀ i ∈ {1,...,n}







Ui(s,z(s))dν(s) ∀ i ∈ {1,...,n}.




i=1 wi(s) and ui(z) ≥ ui(x),i = 1,2,...,n, with strictly inequality for some i.
3 The Excess Utility Function
In order to obtain our results we introduce the excess utility function.
We begin by writing the following well known proposition, see [Kehoe (91)]:




and Ui ∈ Λ, there exists ¯ x(λ) = {¯ x1(λ),···, ¯ xn(λ)} ∈ Rln









i wi and xi ≥ 0.
(2)
5If Ui depend also on s ∈ Ω, and Ui(s,·) ∈ Λ for each s ∈ Ω, and λ ∈ 4n−1, there exists








i wi(s) and xi(s) ≥ 0.
(3)
If γj(s,λ) are the Lagrange multipliers of the problem (3), j ∈ {1,...l}, then from the ﬁrst
order conditions we have:
λi
∂Ui(s, ¯ xi(s,λ))
∂xj = γj(s,λ) with i ∈ {1,...,n} and j ∈ {1,...,l}.
Remark 1 Due to the “inﬁnite marginal utility” condition at zero, the solution of (3) must be
strictly positive almost everywhere. Since U(s,.) is a monotone function, we can deduce that
Pn
i=1 ¯ xi(s) =
Pn
i=1 wi(s).
Let us now deﬁne the excess utility function.
Deﬁnition 5 Let xi(s,λ);i ∈ {1,...,n} be a solution of (3).






γ(s,λ)[xi(s,λ) − wi(s)]dν(s), i = 1,...,n. (4)
is the excess utility function.
Remark 2 Since the solution of (3) is homogeneous of degree zero: i.e, ¯ x(s,λ) = ¯ x(s,αλ) for any
α > 0, then we can consider ei deﬁned all over Rn
++ by ei(αλ) = ei(λ) for all λ ∈ ∆n−1
++ ,α > 0.
4 Equilibrium and the Excess Utility Function.










i wi(s) and xi(s) ≥ 0.
(5)
It is a well known proposition, [Mas-Colell (91)] that an allocation ¯ x, is Pareto optimal if and
only if we can choose a ¯ λ, such that ¯ x solves the above problem with λ = ¯ λ. Moreover, since a
consumer with zero social weight receive nothing of value at a solution of this problem, we have
that if ¯ x is a strictly positive allocation, that is {¯ x ∈ Rl
++}, all consumption has a positive social
weight. See for instance [Kehoe (91)]. Reciprocally if ¯ λ is in the interior of the simplex, then from
remark (1) the solution x(.,λ) of (6) is a strictly positive Pareto optimal allocation, [Kehoe (91)])
6The ﬁrst theorem of welfare establishes that every equilibrium allocation is Pareto
optimal. In our setting this theorem hold. To see this, suppose that there exists a feasible
allocation z that Pareto dominates the equilibrium allocation x. As the equilibrium price p, is
nonnegative for all s ∈ Ω it follows that < p,zi >≥< p,wi >, for all i = 1,2,...,n, and strictly
form some of them. It follows that < p,
Pn
i=1 zi > > < p,
Pn
i=1 wi > (∗). As z is a feasible
allocation, < p,
Pn
i=1 zi > ≤ < p,
Pn
i=1 wi >, holds, contrary to (*).
Let ¯ x be an equilibrium allocation, then there exists a ¯ λ such that ¯ x = { ¯ x1,..., ¯ xn} : Ω → Rn,
is a solution for the problem (6).
In the conditions of our model, the ﬁrst order conditions either for problem (6) or for (3)
are the same. Then if a pair (¯ p, ¯ x) is an price-allocation equilibrium, there exists a ¯ λ such that
¯ x(s) = ¯ x(s, ¯ λ); solves (6) and ¯ p(s) = γ(s, ¯ λ) , solves (4) for a.e.s ∈ Ω.
Moreover we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A pair (¯ p, ¯ x) is an equilibrium, if and only if there exists ¯ λ ∈ 4n−1 such that
¯ x(s) = ¯ x(s, ¯ λ) solves (6), and ¯ p(s) = γ(s, ¯ λ) , solves (4) for a.e.s and e(¯ λ) = 0.
Proof: Suppose that ¯ x(·, ¯ λ) solves (6) and γ(s, ¯ λ) solves (4), then e(¯ λ) = 0. Because ¯ x is
Pareto optimal and from the strictly concavity of each ui,i = 1,2,...,n there is not a feasible
allocation z such that ui(z) ≥ ui(¯ x) and < p,z >=< p,wi > for all consumer. Then the pair
(¯ p, ¯ x), with ¯ p = γ(·, ¯ λ) and ¯ x = x(·, ¯ λ), is an equilibrium. Reciprocally, if (¯ p, ¯ x) is an equilibrium,
then from the ﬁrst welfare theorem, there exists ¯ λ ∈ 4n−1, such that ¯ x is a solution for (6). Since
p is an equilibrium price, it is a support for ¯ x, i.e. if for some x we have that ui(x) ≥ ui(¯ x),i =
{1,...,n}, strictly for some i, then h¯ p,xii > h¯ p,wii and from the ﬁrst order conditions we have
that: ¯ p(s) = γ(¯ λ,s). Then e(¯ λ) = 0. 2
Let be Sn
++ = {λ ∈ Rn : kλk2 =
Pn
i=1 λ2
i = 1,λi > 0}.
From remark 2, with α = 1
kλk, we can consider e deﬁned on Sn
++.
We give now the deﬁnition of the equilibrium set.
Deﬁnition 6 We say that λ is an equilibrium for the economy if λ ∈ E, where E = {λ ∈ Sn
++ :
e(λ) = 0}. The set E will be called, the equilibrium set of the economy.
A pair formed by a utility function and an endowment will be called a characteristic.
We will endow the set of characteristics C = U ×M with the topology generated by the norm
:




(|U| + |∂U| + |∂2U| + kw(s)k).
7Let Γ be the set of economies with characteristics in C such that zero is a regular value of its
excess utility function. That is, for any λ such that e(λ) = 0 we have that rank of the Jacobian
of e(λ), is n − 1, i.e: rankJ[e(λ)] = n − 1. from [Mas-Colell (91)], we know that Γ is open and
dense in the set of economies. From now on we will work with economies in Γ.
Let be TλSn
++ = {¯ λ ∈ Rn : ¯ λλ = 0,λ ∈ Sn
++}, and Πλ the orthogonal projection from Rn
onto TλSn
++. Since whenever e(¯ λ) = 0, J[e(¯ λ)] maps T¯ λSn
++ into T¯ λSn
++ (to verify it diﬀerentiate
λe(λ) = 0), if ¯ λ is a regular value, J[e(¯ λ)] maps T¯ λSn−1
++ . onto T¯ λSn−1
++ . Its determinant is equal
to the determinant of the following matrix, (see [Mas-Colell (85)] B.5.2):
[Π¯ λJ[e(¯ λ)]] =
"




Since Π¯ λJ[e(¯ λ)] is an isomorphism from T¯ λSn−1
++ onto T¯ λSn−1
++ , its determinant is not zero.
We will put signJ(e(λ)) = +1(−1) according to whether det[ΠTJ(e(λ))] > 0(< 0)
We may now state our main result:
Theorem 1 Consider an economy in Γ with inﬁnitely dimensional consumption set, diﬀerentiable
strictly convex proper and separable utilities functions and satisfying the conditions a), b), c) in
section (1,1), then:
(1) The cardinality of E is ﬁnite and odd,
(2) If signJ(e(λ)) is constant in E, there exists an unique equilibrium, where J(e(λ)) denotes
the Jacobian of the excess utility function.
The main tool that will be used to prove theorem 1, is the Poincar´ e Hopf theorem.
Let us recall it.
Poincar´ e Hopf theorem. Let N be a compact n-dimensional C1 manifold with boundary
and f a continuous vector ﬁeld on N. Suppose that:
(i) f points outward at δN [ this means that f(x)g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ δN, where g is the Gauss
map 1] and
(ii) f has a ﬁnite number of zeros.
then the sum of the indices of f at the diﬀerent zeros equals the Euler characteristic of N.
1Recall that if N is a closed C
2 n-dimensional manifold with boundary, then we can deﬁne a C
1 function g from
the boundary of M into S
n−1, called the Gauss map, see [Mas-Colell (85)].
8For the deﬁnition of index of f at x (zero of f) and the Euler characteristic of N, see
[Mas-Colell (85)].
We need, also, the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 The excess utility function is C1.
Proof: The lemma follows immediately from the following assertion: The Lagrange multiplier
γ(s,λ) and the Pareto optimal allocation xi(s,λ) are C1 with respect to λ. Let us consider the
following system of equations:





From the implicit function theorem, taking derivatives in the above system, with respect to x and
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That is B is a (nl) × l matrix
We claim that there is no vector z = (v,w) 6= 0 with v ∈ Rnl and w ∈ Rl such that Mz = 0.
9Indeed, if v is such that Mz = 0, then
Btv = 0 (7)
and
Av + Bw = 0. (8)
Then from (8) and (9), we have that
vtAv = 0 (9)
If v is in the kernel of Bt then
v1 + vl+1 + ···+ v(n−1)l+1 = 0



































λiUi}.v = γ1(v1 + vl+1 + ... + v(n−1)l+1) + ··· + γl(vl + v2l + ... + vnl) = 0. (10)
From (8), (9) and the strictly diﬀerentiable convexity of
Pn
i=1 λiUi we deduce that v = 0.
Then since B is a injective matrix, from (6) w = 0. We have that z = 0, proving our claim.
From the claim and the fact that (Ui(s,·), is in a compact set of Λ, the lemma follows. 2
Lemma 2 The excess utility function has the following properties:
1) e(λ) is homogeneous of degree zero;
2) λe(λ) = 0, ∀λ ∈ Rn
++;
103) there exists k ∈ R such that e(λ) < < k1, where 1 = (1,1,1...,1) ∈ Rn.
4) ||e(λ)|| → ∞ as λj → 0 for any j ∈ {1,...,n} and λ ∈ 4n−1;




Proof: Property 1) follows from remark 2. Property 2) follows from remark 2), and deﬁnition
7). Property 5) That, whenever e(¯ λ) = 0,J[e(¯ λ)] maps into T¯ λSn is a general property of the
vector ﬁeld, [Mas-Colell (85)]. An economy is regular if and only if T¯ λSn maps onto T¯ λSn. This
property identiﬁes de concept of regularity with the non nullity of determinants.





From the concavity of Ui it follows that:



















wi(s))dν(s) and k = sup
1≤i≤n
ki.
Hence, property 3) follows.
To see property 4) recall that γ(s,λ) > 0 and that a consumer with zero social weight receive
nothing of value. Then, since endowments are strictly positive and xi(s,·) is a continuous function
(see lemma 1), the property follows. 2
We can now prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3 : The excess utility function is an outward pointing vector ﬁeld at the boundary of
Sn
++.
Proof: From property 2 of lemma 2 it follows that e(λ) ∈ TλSn
++.







11By Property 3 of Lemma 2, we know that ei(λm) is uniformly bounded above, and because
ke(λ)k → ∞ ( Property 4 of Lemma 2), the limit of ei(λm)/|e(λm)| must be non-positive. Then
we conclude that zi ≤ 0.
Furthermore, zi could be diﬀerent from zero only if λi were zero. This follows from the fact












Letting k0 = −kn/λm
i , we have that k0 ≤ ei(λm) ≤ k. Hence zi = 0. 2
Strictly speaking, we have proved that we have a continuous outward pointing vector ﬁeld for
almost any point in the boundary of Sn−1
++ . The excess utility function has properties similar to
those of the excess demand function. Mas-Colell (1985) proves that for excess demand functions
there is an homotopic inward vector ﬁeld for all points of the boundary Sn−1
++ . In our case, with
an analogous proof, we can obtain an homotopic outward vector ﬁeld for excess utility functions.
Proof of Theorem 1
Since Sn−1
++ is homeomorphic to the (n − 1)-dimensional disk, its Euler characteristic is one.
The equilibrium set E, is a compact set. Moreover, from the fact that zero is a regular value
of e, we have that E is a ﬁnite set. On the other hand, e(λ) is a C1 vector ﬁeld on the tangent
space pointing outward at the boundary of Sn−1
++ . Then we can apply the Poincar´ e Hopf theorem.
In our case the index of the vector ﬁeld e at λ ∈ E is the sign of determinant of J[e(λ)].





The theorem follows by simple cardinality arguments. 2
5 The Case of Incomplete Markets
The exchange economy has n traders and two periods, t = 0,1. There is a state space (Ω,A,ν),
which is a probability space. There is one commodity available in each s ∈ Ω.
Utility functions and endowments are the same as in section 1. At t = 0 there are J < ∞
assets. Each asset is speciﬁed by a measurable bounded return function fj : Ω → Rl
++. Assets
have real returns. There are not initial endowments for assets.
Following [Mas-Colell, Monteiro (96)] we deﬁne an equilibrium for the economy as a set (q, ¯ θ,p, ¯ x),
where:
(a) q ∈ Rj,q 6= 0 is an asset price.
12(b) ¯ θ = (¯ θ1,···, ¯ θn) ∈ RJn is a vector of assets portfolios such that
Pn
i=1 ¯ θi = 0, and q¯ θi ≤
0 ∀i = 1,...,n.
(c) p : Ω → R+ is a non zero, measurable spot commodity price function.




i=1 wi(s), for a.e. s and for every i.










jfj(s), for a.e. s and q¯ θi ≤ 0
It is proved that the equilibrium exists. [Mas-Colell, Monteiro (96)]
As we have a single commodity we can suppose that the spot price p(s) = 1 ∀s ∈ Ω. Then the















jfj(s) ≥ 0 and qθi ≤ 0
Deﬁnition 7 An equilibrium in incomplete markets (GEI equilibrium) with one consumption good
is a vector of asset prices ¯ q ∈ RJ and an allocation of assets ¯ θ ∈ RnJ, such that :
1) ¯ θi solves (13).
2) ¯ θ is a feasible allocation; i.e.
Pn
i=1 ¯ θi = 0.
3) If θ  ¯ θ i.e.: ui(¯ θ) ≥ ui(θ), for all i = 1,2,...,n and with strictly inequality for at least one
of them, θ is not in the budget set.
Since Ui(·) is a strictly concave function, and fj is a positive one, then Ui(wi(s)+
PJ
j=1 fj(s)(·)) :
Rj → R is a strictly concave function. The set Θi = {θ ∈ RJ;wi(s)+
PJ
j=1 fj(s)θj ≥ 0 for a.e.s ∈
Ω} is a lower bounded set. Then an economy with incomplete markets and only one good available
in each state of the world is an Arrow-Debreu model.
The following proposition proves this statement.
13Proposition 3 Every equilibrium assets allocation is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Suppose that ¯ θ ∈ Rnj is an equilibrium allocation, and there is a feasible θ with
θ  ¯ θ. That is, Ui(wi(s) +
PJ
i=1 fj(s)θi
j) ≥ Ui(wi(s) +
PJ
i=1 fj(s)¯ θi
j) strictly for at least one
j ∈ {1,2,...,n}, and
Pn








i=1 q¯ θi. Therefore, qθk < q¯ θk must hold for at




¯ θk k ¯ θk holds. Therefore we have 1
2qθk + 1
2q¯ θk > 0 > q¯ θk. From this we have qθk > q¯ θk,
which is a contradiction. Then ¯ θ, is a Pareto optimal allocation. 2
So, it is possible to derive the equilibrium set using the excess utility function.
5.1 Equilibrium in The Portfolio Choice Problem
In the above conditions, for the portfolio choice problem, if ¯ θ is a Pareto optimal portfolio, we















θi = 0. (13)









fj(s)θi(λ)dν(s) = γ(λ). (14)



































We say that the “social weight” vector ¯ λ is an equilibrium if and only if e(¯ λ) = 0.
14As in section 1, in order to obtain conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium we consider the
Jacobian of the excess utility function.










An Example with Uniqueness
In order to obtain an example with a unique of equilibrium, consider an economy with two
agents and two assets.




















Suppose that there are two agents with endowments wi > 0, two assets and only one good
available in each state.






2dν(s), i = {1,2}.




















































































hence e(λ) has the ”Gross Substitute” property [Dana (93)] and uniqueness of equilibrium follows.
2
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